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25th Annual Monsanto Symposium:  
Civil Litigation as a Tool for 
Regulating Climate Change 
CIVIL LITIGATION AS A TOOL FOR 
REGULATING CLIMATE CHANGE:  AN 
INTRODUCTION 
James R. May* 
It is an honor to write the introduction for this special issue of the 
law review.  Every now and again there is a case that subjects the U.S. 
Supreme Court to a kind of stress-test.  A case that reveals the Court’s 
willingness to engage in tough social issues, or instead kick the can to 
coordinate branches of government, or to the states.  On occasion, an 
environmental case will push the Court mightily over constitutional 
issues of standing, political question doctrine, separation of powers, and 
federalism.  The recently decided American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut (“AEP”) is just such a case.1 
This issue of the law review takes a hard look at the implications of 
AEP. It features one of the amicus briefs filed in the case, and offers three 
divergent commentaries. In Law Professors’ Brief on Behalf of Respondents, 
Stuart Banner and I argue that the Court has never held, or even 
suggested, that constitutional doctrine forecloses judicial review of 
common law claims like the one in this case.2  And even if the political 
question doctrine limited judicial consideration of common law claims, 
we conclude that the public nuisance claims in AEP are not non-
                                                 
* James R. May is Professor of Law and Graduate Engineering (adjunct) at Widener 
University where he teaches constitutional and environmental law and co-directs the 
Environmental Law Center.  He was Counsel of Record for the Brief of Law Professors on 
Behalf of Respondents in AEP v. Connecticut. He wrote this essay in conjunction with 
remarks delivered to Valparaiso University School of Law’s 25th Annual Monsanto 
Symposium, entitled Civil Litigation as a Tool for Regulating Climate Change on February 18, 
2011. He may be reached at:  jrmay@widener.edu. 
1 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). For a summary of the 
decision, see James May, Supreme Court Decides that Clean Air Act Displaces Federal Common 
Law Claims for Climate Change, TRENDS (ABA), Sept.–Oct. 2011 [hereinafter May, Supreme 
Court Decides]. 
2  See also James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, and the Political 
Question Doctrine, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 919 (2008) (arguing that common law claims 
respecting GHGs are justiciable). 
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justiciable political questions.  In Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal 
Climate Change Regulation:  Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, Hari M. 
Osofsky explores the significance of AEP for U.S. federal legal 
approaches to regulating climate change. Professor Osofsky concludes 
that AEP leaves most greenhouse gas (“GHG”) cases unaffected.3  In 
Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 
Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, and Christopher E. Appel answer the 
question in the negative. They conclude that regulation of GHG 
emissions is best left to the elected federal branches.4  In On Thin Air:  
Standing, Climate Change and the National Environmental Policy Act, Kevin 
Haroff concludes that causes of action concerning GHGs rooted in 
federal statutory laws other than the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), e.g., the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), are unlikely to reduce 
GHG emissions.5 
This Essay contains a summary of AEP and discusses its 
implications.  It concludes that AEP has had a profound impact on GHG 
litigation and policymaking. It will be the case of threshold reference on 
issues of displacement, constitutional and prudential standing, the 
political question doctrine, and the role of common and statutory law in 
addressing GHG emissions.  
I.  OVERVIEW OF AEP 
In AEP, a combination of states, the City of New York, and several 
land trust organizations sued the nation’s five largest fossil-fuel-burning 
electric utility companies to force them to reduce their GHG emissions.  
The plaintiffs argued that GHG emissions from the utilities contributed 
to a public nuisance under the federal common law.  The Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected this claim, reasoning that the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) had taken sufficient action as authorized by 
the CAA to regulate GHG emissions so as to displace associated federal 
common law nuisance causes of action for injunctive action. 
The issues in AEP developed in a peculiar way.  The plaintiffs asked 
the court for injunctive relief to “cap” defendants’ emissions, develop a 
schedule for reducing defendants’ emissions on a percentage basis over 
time, assess and measure available alternative energy resources, and 
                                                 
3 Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation:  
Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447, 453–54 (2012). 
4 Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel, Does the Judiciary Have the 
Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 371 (2012). 
5 Kevin T. Haroff, On Thin Air—Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 411, 446 (2012).  
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reconcile its relief with U.S. foreign and domestic policy.  The utility 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
dismissed the case on a ground that the defendants had not originally 
briefed:  the political question doctrine.6  The doctrine holds that federal 
courts should not consider certain matters consigned to the 
representative branches.  The court concluded that it was impossible for 
it to make the “initial policy determination . . . that must be made by the 
elected branches before a non-elected court can properly adjudicate a 
global warming nuisance claim.”7  It concluded that plaintiffs’ 
allegations were “extraordinary,” “patently political,” and 
“transcendently legislative.”8  Thus, the district court ruled that the 
doctrine applied to divest federal courts from hearing the plaintiffs’ 
federal common law claims. 
The case idled on appeal at the Second Circuit for more than four 
years.  In 2009, a two judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals—that had 
originally included Judge and now Supreme Court Associate Justice 
Sotomayor—for the Second Circuit reversed, finding climate claims in 
tort law to be justiciable.9  The court held that no aspect of the political 
question doctrine applied to enjoin judicial review.  In particular, the 
circuit court found that climate change is neither constitutionally 
consigned to the elected branches, nor prudentially left to them. 
The U.S. Supreme Court then granted American Electric Power and 
the other utility defendants’ petition for certiorari on three issues, 
whether:  (1) the states and other plaintiffs lacked standing; (2) federal 
law displaced plaintiffs’ claims; and (3) the case raised nonjusticiable 
political questions.  Justice Sotomayor recused herself from the case, 
leaving it before the eight remaining justices. 
The Obama administration filed a brief on behalf of defendant 
Tennessee Valley Authority—on the same side as the utility 
defendants—arguing that plaintiffs lack prudential standing and federal 
law displaces the need for common law causes of action for climate 
change.  In particular, the solicitor general argued that various EPA 
activities displace the need for federal common law causes of action. 
Oral argument harbored a few surprises.  None of the justices 
seriously questioned that climate change is occurring, that human 
activity is playing a role in that dynamic, that the CAA bestows upon 
EPA the authority to regulate GHGs as a “pollutant” under Massachusetts 
                                                 
6 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
7 Id. at 272–73. 
8 Id. at 271 n.6, 272. 
9 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 393 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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v. EPA, that at least the states possess both constitutional and prudential 
standing, or that federal courts have authority to consider cases 
concerning climate change. 
Yet the Court was clearly uncomfortable with elevating the 
judgment of a district judge about GHGs over that of other coordinate 
branches.   
[S]everal Justices expressed skepticism about the 
propriety of using federal common law in this context, 
including the more “liberal” wing of the [C]ourt—
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena 
Kagan.  For example, Justice Breyer asked, “if the courts 
can set emission standards, why can’t they also set 
carbon taxes, which are likely to be more effective? 
What's the end of it?”  Justice Kagan inquired, “this 
sounds like the paradigmatic thing that administrative 
agencies do rather than courts.”  Justice Ginsburg 
remarked to the respondents’ attorney:  “Congress set 
up the EPA to promulgate standards for emissions, 
and . . . the relief you’re seeking seems to me to set up a 
district judge, who does not have the resources, the 
expertise, as a kind of super EPA.”10 
Many in attendance (including me) saw the writing on the wall, an 8-0 
finish, details to be announced. 
Sure enough, the Court reversed the Second Circuit 8-0 (Justice 
Sotomayor, recused), deciding that federal public law displaces the 
federal common law before it. In so doing, the Court hardly engaged 
two-thirds of the issues before it.  Moreover, four Justices, including 
Justice Kennedy, accepted without analysis that the states possess 
constitutional standing under Massachusetts v. EPA. 11  This suggests that 
five members of the Court, including Justice Sotomayor, still accept that 
position.  None of the justices seriously questioned that climate change is 
occurring and that human activity is playing a role in that dynamic,12 or 
that the CAA bestows upon EPA the authority to regulate GHGs as a 
                                                 
10  May, Supreme Court Decides, supra note 1, at 1, 15. 
11 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
12 One curious aspect of the decision is that notwithstanding the extent to which the 
Court seemed to rely on Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Ginsburg noted: “The Court, we 
caution, endorses no particular view of the complicated issues related to carbon dioxide 
emissions and climate change.”  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 
n.2 (2011). 
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“pollutant” under the CAA.13  None of the justices saw fit to discuss 
either the political question or prudential standing arguments.  This 
could suggest that eight justices do not believe that these issues are 
salient in the climate context under federal common law. 
Instead, the Court honed in on the displacement issue.  Justice 
Ginsburg’s reluctance to convert district courts into “super” EPAs 
proved a harbinger.  Writing for an 8-0 majority of the Court, Justice 
Ginsburg held that the authority that the CAA grants to the EPA to 
regulate GHGs, when coupled with what EPA had done, displaces 
federal common law in the matter.  In light of developments in the first 
branch, the Court was simply unwilling to vest federal judges with the 
task of performing what it viewed to be primarily regulatory roles 
subject to democratic processes: 
The judgments the plaintiffs would commit to federal 
judges, in suits that could be filed in any federal district, 
cannot be reconciled with the decision making scheme 
Congress enacted.  The Second Circuit erred, we hold, in 
ruling that federal judges may set limits on [GHG] 
emissions in face of a law empowering EPA to set the 
same limits, subject to judicial review only to ensure 
against action “arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not 
in accordance with law.”14 
Indeed, the regulatory goalposts have shifted significantly since the 
initial case was filed in 2004.  Since then, EPA has, among other climate 
regulatory activities:  determined that GHGs “endanger” public health 
and welfare and are thus a “pollutant” subject to regulation under the 
CAA; issued rules requiring utilities and others to report their GHG 
emissions; said that new or modified major sources of GHGs may be 
subject to new source review; and said that other new sources may be 
subject to new source performance standards for GHG emissions. 
The Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA that the CAA provides 
EPA with discretionary authority to regulate GHGs as “air pollutants” 
loomed large: 
                                                 
13 Notably, however, Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) issued a brief concurrence 
that seems to question Massachusetts v. EPA.  As Justice Alito wrote in somewhat stilted 
prose, “I agree with the Court’s displacement analysis on the assumption (which I make for 
the sake of argument because no party contends otherwise) that the interpretation of the 
[CAA] adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA, is correct.”  Id. at 2540–41 (Alito, J., 
with whom Thomas, J., joins, concurring) (citation omitted). 
14  Id. at 2540 (second alteration in original). 
May: Civil Litigation as a Tool for Regulating Climate Change: An Intr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
362 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
We hold that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it 
authorizes displace any federal common law right to 
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-
fuel fired power plants.  Massachusetts made plain that 
emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution 
subject to regulation under the Act.  And we think it 
equally plain that the Act “speaks directly” to emissions 
of carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants.15 
Moreover, the Court was unconvinced that federal courts in 
common law nuisance suits should play a role in competing with EPA’s 
regulatory authority: 
It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert 
agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as primary 
regulator of [GHG] emissions.  The expert agency is 
surely better equipped to do the job than individual 
district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.  
Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and 
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping 
with issues of this order.16 
In sum, the Court held that the federal common law claims for 
injunctive relief are displaced because they are already within EPA’s 
regulatory grasp under the CAA. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
So where does this leave common law and the regulation of GHGs?  
Professor Osofsky concludes in this issue that AEP leaves most causes of 
action to address GHG emissions intact.17  She observes that AEP “leaves 
alone most pending litigation except for the limited set of cases claiming 
federal common law nuisance, and even then it indicates that its ruling 
depends on the current context of EPA authority.”18  Schwartz, 
Goldberg, and Appel, however, disagree, concluding here: 
that federal and state judiciaries, given their institutional 
constraints, do not have the capabilities to establish 
GHG emission limits in an effective, consistent, and 
                                                 
15 Id. at 2537 (citations omitted). 
16 Id. at 2539–40. 
17 See Osofsky, supra note 3, at 454–55. 
18 Id. at 455. 
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nondiscriminatory manner.  It also shows that the 
Supreme Court, in [AEP], provided a blueprint and 
broad mandate for state and federal courts to reject any 
claim that would regulate GHG emissions.19 
The kind of cases that AEP leaves open is most likely limited to 
public nuisance under state common law, public nuisance under federal 
common law for damages, and an ever increasing canon of cases under 
federal environmental statutes, including the NEPA.  First, the Court 
explained that its ruling does not affect state common law causes of 
action:  “None of the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise 
addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We 
therefore leave the matter open for consideration on remand.”20  The 
Court noted that any such action would warrant examination under the 
Supremacy Clause:  “In light of our holding that the [CAA] displaces 
federal common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, 
inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the Federal [CCA].”21 
Second, AEP did not address federal common law causes of action 
for damages.  Chief among these cases is Native Village of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., an action against the oil and gas industry under 
federal common law for $440 million in damages.  The district court 
dismissed that action as a nonjusticiable political question, holding that 
“neither [p]laintiffs nor AEP offers any guidance as to precisely what 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards are to be employed in 
resolving the claims at issue. . . . [Furthermore,] cases do not provide 
guidance that would enable the Court to reach a resolution of this case in 
any ‘reasoned’ manner.”22  Native Village of Kivalina is currently before 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.23 
Third, AEP does not rule out federal common law actions for public 
nuisance for injunctive relief entirely if EPA either loses or does not 
exercise its regulatory authority over GHGs.  The 112th Congress and 
several presidential candidates have made blocking EPA action on 
climate change a priority, after all.  Suspending or terminating EPA’s 
authority to regulate GHGs could stretch the displacement defense to the 
breaking point.  Yet as Professor Osofsky observes here, regulatory suits 
“provide limited opportunities for victims to obtain redress.”24 
                                                 
19  Schwartz, et al., supra note 4, at 371. 
20 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540. 
21 Id. 
22 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
23 Appellant’s Opening Brief, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobile Corp, No. 09-
17490 (filed Mar. 10, 2010). 
24 See Osofsky, supra note 3, at 456. 
May: Civil Litigation as a Tool for Regulating Climate Change: An Intr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
364 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
Any examination of federal common law would likely warrant 
reanimation of the political question doctrine.  The Supreme Court has 
noted that there are certain “formulations” of cases that raise so-called 
“political questions.”  These include matters that are demonstrably 
committed to a coordinate branch of government, require an initial 
policy determination, lack ascertainable standards, or could otherwise 
result in judicial embarrassment—such matters are nonjusticiable.25  For 
example, the Court has recognized executive power over foreign affairs, 
impeachment, and treaty abrogation as political questions into which 
courts ought to decline jurisdiction, finding them to be consigned to the 
elected federal branches of government under the “political question 
doctrine.”26 
That none of the justices engaged the political question doctrine head 
on could suggest a number of things.  At least eight justices do not 
believe that the political question doctrine is a salient issue in the climate 
context under federal common law.  Indeed, the Court seemed to suggest 
that the doctrine did not call into question Massachusetts v. EPA: 
We hold that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it 
authorizes displace any federal common law right to 
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-
fuel fired power plants.  Massachusetts made plain that 
emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution 
subject to regulation under the Act.  And we think it 
equally plain that the Act “speaks directly” to emissions 
of carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants.27 
On the other hand, the Court’s reasoning in finding plaintiffs’ federal 
common law claims to be displaced might apply with congruent force to 
the political question doctrine.  But whether and how the political 
question doctrine applies in cases involving federal common law and 
climate remains to be seen. 
All eight participating justices were skeptical about the propriety of 
using federal common law in this context:  “The judgments the plaintiffs 
would commit to federal judges, in suits that could be filed in any 
federal district, cannot be reconciled with the decisionmaking scheme 
                                                 
25 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see, James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional 
Consignment, and the Political Question Doctrine, supra note 2, at 958.  
26 See generally James R. May, The Political Question Doctrine in Environmental Law, in 
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 217, 220 (James R. May ed., 2011).  
Climate change litigation has now entered this mix. 
27 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (citations omitted). 
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Congress enacted.”28  Yet the Court has never applied the doctrine to 
foreclose review of common law claims. 
In fact, as Stuart Banner and I maintain in our brief, under the 
political question doctrine, certain constitutional issues are reserved to the 
political branches for decision.  The doctrine has no application to 
common law claims like the one in AEP.  The Court should reject 
invitations to extend the doctrine far beyond its traditional limits. 
In every case in which the Court has found federal jurisdiction 
lacking because of the political question doctrine, the plaintiff’s claim has 
been founded on the Constitution.  Meanwhile, the Court has addressed 
a great many common law issues over the years, without ever 
suggesting, much less holding, that any of them might be political 
questions.  This sharp distinction is not a mere matter of labeling.  It is a 
fundamental divide necessitated by the very nature of the political 
question doctrine, which is rooted in the Constitution’s separation of 
powers.  The six formulations established in Baker v. Carr,29 are tools for 
dividing constitutional claims between the competence of the courts and 
the political branches.  They have never had any bearing on common law 
claims, which are always within the competence of courts. 
Whenever a constitutional issue that is non-justiciable under the 
political question doctrine has arisen within a lawsuit under the common 
law, the Court has deferred to the political branches’ resolution of the 
constitutional issue, but has nevertheless always retained jurisdiction 
over the common law case and decided it on the merits.  In such cases, 
the Court has never decided that the common law claim itself is non-
justiciable. 
To be sure, there is no reason to accept petitioners’ invitation to 
expand the political question doctrine far beyond its traditional confines.  
A legal issue is not converted into a political question simply because 
one might have policy grounds for preferring that it be resolved by 
another branch of government.  Even if this nuisance suit will be as novel 
and complex as petitioners allege, their concerns can be addressed the 
way such concerns have always been addressed, through the courts’ 
interpretation of the common law of nuisance. 
And even if the political question doctrine applied to non-
constitutional issues, this nuisance claim would not be a political 
question.  None of the six Baker formulations is inextricable from this 
case.  The authority to resolve common law nuisance claims is neither 
textually nor implicitly committed to either Congress or the President. 
                                                 
28 Id. at 2540. 
29 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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Nuisance claims are not textually committed to the political 
branches.  The Constitution does not commit to the political branches the 
exclusive power to resolve nuisance claims, to adjudicate environmental 
disputes, or to address the question of climate change.  If there is any 
constitutional text authorizing one of the branches to decide this case, it 
is Article III, which explicitly provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall 
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity . . . .”30 
Nuisance claims are governed by judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards.  Petitioners argue that because the law of 
nuisance incorporates a broad reasonableness standard rather than a set 
of precise rules, there will be no “right” or “wrong” answers in this case.  
But that is an argument that would make political questions out of all 
nuisance cases, not just this one.  Indeed, all of the Court’s prior nuisance 
cases were governed by the very same standards that petitioners claim 
are undiscoverable in this case. 
An issue does not become non-justiciable merely because it is 
governed by a broad standard like reasonableness.  An issue is non-
justiciable when it is governed by no standard at all.  When the 
applicable standard is merely broadly worded or incapable of being 
reduced to bright line rules, the Court has consistently refused to hold 
that an issue is a political question. 
Nuisance claims can be decided without an initial policy 
determination of the kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.  This Baker 
formulation prevents courts from making only those policy 
determinations that are clearly within the exclusive power of the 
executive branch, involving matters like which nation has sovereignty 
over disputed territory, and it proscribes only decisions explicitly setting 
forth the policy of the United States on a particular matter.  It does not 
bar courts from making the implicit policy judgments they traditionally 
make in common law cases. 
None of the remaining Baker formulations is inextricable from a 
common law case respecting GHGs.  A court applying the common law 
would not express any lack of the respect due to the political branches.  
The common law of nuisance cannot override any decisions already 
made by the political branches.  And there is no possibility of 
inconsistent pronouncements by the judiciary and another branch, 
because the other branches can always displace the common law of 
nuisance. 
Last, AEP does not affect efforts to invoke federal statutory laws to 
address GHG emissions, such as NEPA.  Kevin Haroff concludes in these 
                                                 
30 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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pages, however, that such actions will not reduce actual emissions of 
GHGs: 
Nevertheless, courts should be careful to recognize that 
using NEPA as a litigation strategy may have limited 
value as a weapon in any war on global warming. After 
more than a quarter century of judicial development, the 
rules governing standing under NEPA and other federal 
environmental laws are well established, and they 
necessarily focus on relatively localized impacts from 
domestic projects, which have a substantial federal 
connection with the United States. Those rules are not 
intended to apply to highly-generalized impacts 
associated with a global phenomenon like climate 
change, caused by activities diffusely spread across the 
planet.  In the case of agency actions, like those 
considered in Watson, a requirement to prepare detailed 
environmental impact studies under NEPA will not 
reduce global warming in any appreciable way.31 
This, combined with the shortcomings in common and existing 
statutory law and international treaties, seems to invite the question of 
just how legally to address GHG emissions, short of a new, specially 
crafted piece of legislation to do so, something akin to a “Greenhouse 
Gas Act.” 
III.  CONCLUSION 
AEP is an important decision in the field of environmental law.  It 
stands astride several junctures:  public and private law; environmental, 
constitutional, and international law; injunctive and legal relief; state and 
federal action; and judicially, legislatively, and administratively 
fashioned responses.  With its cornucopian issues extraordinaire—
separation of powers, federalism, standing, displacement, political 
question, tort, and prudence—it has something for nearly all legal tastes, 
temperaments, and talents.  AEP will continue to have profound and 
uncertain impacts on GHG related litigation and regulation, especially 
concerning jurisprudential notions of displacement, constitutional and 
prudential standing, the political question doctrine, and the role of 
common and statutory law.  
                                                 
31 Haroff, supra note 5, at 446. 
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